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Reflected Words:  
Meaning and Silence in Language and Translation 
 
Melanie Sard 
 
What role does translation play in philosophy of language? Recent 
development in the field has drawn parallels between theories of 
translation and theories of meaning, evident primarily in the work of 
Davidson and Quine. Communication has often been viewed as an act 
of translation or interpretation between speakers, particularly by 
Davidson in later writings.1 I think it is equally useful to view 
translation as an act of communication, and this approach is particularly 
valuable because it leads us to the conclusion that meaning is created 
through dialectic processes.2 Although translation studies has recently 
emerged as a new and promising academic field,3 it usually separates 
philosophical analysis from literary criticism. Quine’s work is typical of 
the philosophical approach, which concerns itself with hypothetical 
translation situations. What is of importance in these cases is the 
general process of translation, separate from any specific language. 
Quine’s radical translation thought experiment involves an imagined 
language of which we had no “prior understanding.”4 Davidson 
considers this situation as well, but does not restrict himself to it. He is 
1 Donald Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Truth, Language, and History. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005. 
2 Roughly, I intend to use “dialectic” as it is used in the Hegelian tradition, to mean “the process 
of thought by which contradictions are seen to merge themselves in a higher truth that 
comprehends them” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2005). 
3 See The Translation Studies Reader, ed. Lawrence Venuti New York: Routledge, 2001. See also 
George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975.  
4 Hans-Johann Glock, “The Indispensibility of Translation in Quine and Davidson,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 43, No. 171 (April 1993) pp 194-209. 
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also interested in the actual problems of interpretation that occur 
between speakers, even if they are speakers of the same language. 
However, neither Quine nor Davidson deal with actual translation 
techniques for literary works, which are usually discussed only within 
the context of literary criticism. It is my contention that the philo-
sophical significance of literary translation has for the most part been 
overlooked, and I hope to show that literary translation has something 
to contribute to the more general discussion of translation and meaning 
within philosophy of language. 
In order to argue this, I want to make clear the distinctions I am 
drawing between different types of translation. Hypothetical translation 
refers to a situation that does not involve translating between specific, 
actually known languages (English, French, Russian, for example). 
Quine’s thought experiment features the imaginary word “gavagai,” a 
piece of language arbitrarily invented by him.5 It is important that this 
choice be arbitrary, since Quine wants to make claims about language 
and translation in general, not just one particular language. While 
hypothetical translation may certainly be a useful tool for building a 
theory of meaning, I think we are missing valuable insight if we 
consider only this type of translation. Most translation does occur in the 
context of specific languages, and therefore I want to differentiate it by 
calling it actual translation.  
Within the general category of actual translation, I will use the term 
“literary” with respect to any translation, between specific languages, of 
creative poetry or prose. A large amount of translation activity does not 
fit this description, however: instruction manuals, brochures, formal 
and informal dialogue, for example. This kind of translation can be 
problematic as well, even if the topic is relatively straightforward. It is 
possible to mistranslate apparently simple pieces of language, and many 
texts that fall into the category of non-literary translation are far from 
simple. In this paper I want to focus on literary translation to highlight 
the difficulties that accompany all translation, hypothetical or actual.  
My analysis of literary translation leads to the view that language 
and meaning are contingent human creations, a view which is 
supported by Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s work in philosophy of 
language. One of the consequences of this view is that the failure of 
language, in the form of silence, takes on unique significance. By failure 
of language I am referring to situations where, for whatever reason, we 
5 W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1960, p. 29 
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are unable to articulate a clearly existing thought, emotion, or 
experience. In this case, silence itself is what is meaningful, since it 
indicates that experience even as it fails to express it. Wittgenstein 
famously said, at the conclusion of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” 6 
Regardless of whether meaning is fixed or contingent, it may be true 
that there are no right words to express the experience. In particular, 
however, a contingent view of meaning (one in which the meaning of a 
word or words is subject to change) lends itself to circumstances where 
language and meaning do not perfectly line up. I believe such situations 
are inherent in language and our use of it. 
What are the repercussions of this conclusion? It emphasizes the 
role of silence as an important aspect of language, and loss as an 
important component of meaning. These issues become particularly 
apparent when we study literary translation, especially difficult or con-
troversial cases. As an example of this, I want to discuss Nabokov’s 
work on translating the famous Russian poem Eugene Onegin and his 
subsequent reflections on the endeavor. This philosophical approach to 
literary translation results in a complex but valuable conception of 
meaning, which functions both within and across languages. I believe 
this conception of meaning is consistent with the theories of meaning 
Quine and Davidson have developed from hypothetical translation. 
This conclusion emphasizes that translation, both hypothetical and 
actual, is capable of providing valuable insight in questions of language 
and meaning. 
The idea of “radical translation” was first posited by Quine in a 
1959 essay on meaning and translation, later to become part of a larger 
work entitled Word and Object.7 The problem that Quine encountered 
was that it seemed logically possible to attribute different meanings to a 
sentence based on its stimulus conditions (the conditions under which 
we would utter it), and no amount of analysis could definitively fix one 
particular meaning as correct. Furthermore, Quine claimed that the 
stimulus conditions for language as a whole were insufficient to 
determine a single set of meanings. In a hypothetical translation scen-
ario, a linguist attempting to learn an unknown language would begin 
by observing the stimulus conditions of certain sentences. In Quine’s 
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D.F. Pears and B. F.  
McGuinness. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. p. 151 (Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, 
daruber muss man schweigen)
7 Quine, “Meaning and Translation,” in The Translation Studies Reader 
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example, the stimulus condition is a rabbit running by and the sentence 
offered by the native speaker is “gavagai.”8 Of course more work is 
required to determine whether the meaning of “gavagai” is really 
“rabbit,” for it might simply mean “white,” or “animal,” and still be 
responsive to the same stimulus conditions. Through further inquiry, 
the linguist will probably be able to narrow down the possibilities, and 
if the stimulus conditions that cause the native speaker to assent to the 
sentence “gavagai” are the same as the stimulus conditions that cause 
the linguist to assent to the sentence “rabbit,” then we might reason-
ably conclude that “gavagai” is an accurate translation for “rabbit.”9
The problem, as Quine sees it, is that we can never narrow down 
all the possibilities, and a certain indeterminacy about what sentences 
mean is inevitable. Perhaps “gavagai” merely refers to a temporal stage 
of a rabbit, for example, and not a whole enduring rabbit.10 Such 
differentiation is beyond the capacity of the linguist to identify through 
observation, since the stimulus conditions of the two meanings are 
exactly overlapping. If there is an indeterminacy of translation for 
sentences, it follows that the words of the sentence must be in-
determinate, too. Quine calls this dilemma the inscrutability of 
reference.11 While this particular example may seem nonsensical, I think 
Quine’s point is a valid one. In order to choose a determinate meaning 
for “gavagai,” we would have to presuppose that the native conceptual 
scheme of reality is the same as ours.12 Our conceptual scheme might 
adequately fit all the stimulus conditions of the word in the native 
language, yet still differ from the native conceptual scheme. The basic 
argument here is that it is logically possible for multiple meanings to 
satisfy the same stimulus conditions.  
Since Quine’s view of language is holistic, simple sentences such as 
“rabbit” or “gavagai” are necessarily situated in a larger network of 
interlocking sentences, such that the unit of analysis must become the 
totality of the language(s).13 Therefore the indeterminacy of meaning 
holds for whole languages, resulting in the conclusion that “manuals for 
translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, 
8 Quine, Word and Object, p. 29 
9 Ibid, p. 40 
10 Quine, “Meaning and Translation,” in The Translation Studies Reader, p. 98 
11 Quine, Word and Object, p. 80. Although he does not use the specific phrase until later writings 
(see Davidson, “The Inscrutability of Reference,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001. p. 227), the basis for the theory is clear in Word and Object.
12 Quine, “Meaning and Translation,” in The Translation Studies Reader, p. 99 
13 Quine, Word and Object, pp 34-35 
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all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible 
with another.”14 Quine wants to extend this thesis to apply within the 
languages themselves as well. In the same way that meaning is 
underdetermined by stimulus conditions in radical translation, our 
beliefs are underdetermined by the available sensory evidence in the 
world around us.15 We could, in fact, rearrange our system of beliefs to 
be completely different yet still consistent with observable facts; this is 
the claim that Quine earlier defended in “Two Dogmas of Empir-
icism,” one of his most influential essays.16 In both of these cases, what 
is pertinent to my project is the way in which Quine unfixes meaning. It 
is not that we cannot be sure about what the right meaning is, he wants 
to argue, but that the “right” meaning is an empty concept: there is no 
objective fact of the matter.17 This leaves us with the view that meaning 
is changeable, rather than static, and furthermore we as human beings 
are the ones capable of changing it.  
There are certain restraints on this, of course. Individuals cannot 
manipulate the meanings of words in whatever way they want. For 
example, if you were to suddenly go around calling a rabbit a “gavagai,” 
you would be ridiculed. It would be an idiosyncratic and arbitrary 
creation of meaning that would have no significance in the larger 
language community. I do not want to imply, when I claim that mean-
ing is created, that we can do whatever we want with words – that all 
meanings have equal weight. Language is clearly a social phenomenon, 
and the meanings of words function more or less consistently within a 
community. Furthermore, Quine would want to say that the meanings 
of words fundamentally function in connection with the empirical 
evidence of stimulus conditions. In his discussion of radical translation 
he writes: “There is less basis of comparison – less sense in saying what 
is good translation and what is bad – the father we get away from 
sentences with visibly direct conditioning to non-verbal stimuli.”18 This 
is what sometimes makes literary translation so controversial and 
difficult; poetic language tends to be abstract and far from simple 
stimulus conditions. Although meaning is contingent, it is created 
within the framework of already existing language practices and 
14 Ibid, p. 27 
15 Ibid, p. 78 
16 Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1953. 
pp 20-46 
17 Quine, Word and Object, p. 73 
18 Quine, Word and Object, p. 78 
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observable stimulus conditions; new meanings emerge in shapes and 
directions that are governed by existing meanings. 
But what, exactly, is the process by which we get from an old 
meaning to a new meaning? This is a question that preoccupies 
Davidson in several essays, including “What Metaphors Mean” and “A 
Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.” In the first, he explores how meta-
phors create different meanings for ordinary pieces of language; the 
new meaning succeeds by virtue of its surprising deviation from the 
old.19 However on the subject of interpretation, Davidson does not, 
“except in matters of degree, distinguish metaphor from more routine 
linguistic transactions: all communication by speech assumes the inter-
play of inventive construction and inventive construal.”20 The second 
essay is concerned with how speakers interpret and understand each 
other in everyday language situations. Traditionally, language has been 
characterized as a finite system of rule-based relationships. But 
linguistic ability, Davidson believes, cannot be explained by appeal to 
such prior conventions, because they are neither sufficient nor 
necessary to describe the process of communication.21 
This is not to say that Davidson sees linguistic convention as 
entirely irrelevant, rather, he wants to place it alongside other resources 
for interpretation. He posits that communication consists of two parts: 
a prior theory and a passing theory. Prior theory is a person’s back-
ground knowledge of linguistic conventions, or what we normally refer 
to when we say we “know how to speak” a language. This includes 
information about grammar, vocabulary, syntax, semantics, and the like. 
It also includes cultural information; making sense of someone’s speech 
may involve placing it in cultural or socio-political context. However, 
we often tinker with these linguistic conventions in order to 
accommodate the phrases that we hear, which may be grammatically 
incorrect or semantically unclear. We formulate passing theories 
(derived from prior theories) in order to cope with the language that we 
encounter. Davidson suggests that this is something that occurs every 
time we talk to another person. When we have effectively com-
municated, it is due to the fact that our passing theories have 
converged.22 But a passing theory can never be duplicated, since the 
information it contains is in each case particular to that case. The 
19 Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation, p. 247 
20 Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation, p. 245 
21 Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Truth, Meaning, and History, p. 107 
22 Ibid, pp. 100, 107 
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success of a passing theory is what communication really depends on, 
Davidson argues, but it cannot be made into a linguistic standard, and 
hence undermines the traditional conception of language as a rule-
governed activity. 
From here, it is easy to see how Davidson comes to the conclusion 
that “all understanding of the speech of another involves radical inter-
pretation.”23 He uses the term radical interpretation, rather than 
Quine’s radical translation, because he wants to cover a broader range 
of activities which include non-linguistic behavior. He claims that 
“general knowledge of the world, and awareness of human interests 
and attitudes,” are also important resources that we bring to the project 
of communication.24 Although Davidson’s concern is with actual 
communication, his treatment of translation or interpretation is still 
hypothetical. He only requires a potential account, at least as a first step; 
he wants the explanation to be logically possible. The account “does 
not […] concern the actual history of language acquisition.”25 What 
Davidson is establishing here is a scheme where translation operates as 
a metaphor for communication. Implicit in this analysis is the 
assumption that if we can state the conditions under which we could 
successfully translate the language, we will have a key to understanding 
how we accomplished the translation and indeed to how language works 
in general. Davidson’s answer is that we accomplish translation, and 
communication, by an adaptive mechanism that is flexible according to 
the situations it encounters. As I see it, passing theory results from an 
oscillation between two points: the prior theory and the actual utter-
ance. If the latter two do not contradict each other, then the passing 
theory requires no adjustment from the prior theory. But if they are at 
odds with each other, the passing theory must bridge the gap, so to 
speak, between two points. It is only through this process that the 
passing theory, as new meaning, can emerge. As interpreted this way, I 
think Davidson’s work is an important part of my attempt to 
characterize meaning as a dialectic process.  
Another writer relevant to the discussion is George Steiner. His 
book After Babel, first published in 1975, is in many ways sympathetic to 
the view of translation I am trying to develop. He, too, follows the 
communication as translation metaphor, claiming:  
Translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in every act of communication […] The 
essential structure and executive means and problems of the act of translation are fully 
23 Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p. 125 
24 Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p. 110 
25 Ibid, p. 125 
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present in acts of speech, of writing, of pictorial encoding inside any given language. 
Translation between languages is a particular application of a configuration and model 
fundamental to human speech.26
This is a strongly stated thesis and one could, perhaps, object to it. 
Critics would point out that there is a vast difference between the 
difficulties encountered while speaking your own language and those 
encountered while trying to speak another one. When I say “I don’t 
understand you” to someone who is speaking my native language, it is 
not that same thing as saying “I don’t understand you” to someone 
who is talking to me in a language I don’t know. What Steiner would 
argue, though, is that this is a difference of degree and not kind. It is 
not a separate sort of difficulty that is encountered when trying to 
speak another language; it is just a much greater difficulty. Davidson, I 
think, would agree, since his view of language is a holistic one that is 
concerned with “knowing our way around in the world generally.”27 
Different languages are just instances of the challenges we face in trying 
to find our way around the world, including the challenge of trying to 
communicating in particular language itself.  
What is helpful about Steiner’s work, especially in comparison to 
Quine, is that it incorporates the notion of actual translation. In 
Davidson’s analysis, if a theory concerning how language works cannot 
explain certain pertinent aspects of the language, then it is an 
unacceptable theory, since it results in an “unlearnable” language.28 I 
think we might reasonably expect a theory to account for actual 
translation as well as hypothetical translation. Davidson does, to a 
certain extent, discuss actual translation situations, both interlingual and 
intralingual.29 Steiner emphasizes that actual translation is a pertinent 
aspect of language, and indeed an intriguing one; he correctly points 
out that “a genuine philosophy of language […] must grapple with the 
phenomenon and rationale of the human ‘invention’ and retention of 
anywhere between five and ten thousand distinct tongues,” and the 
problems of translation that such a situation entails.30 His explanation is 
26 Steiner, After Babel, p. xxi 
27 Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Truth, Language, and History, p. 107  
28 Davidson, “Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 
29 Roman Jakobson makes a distinction between “intralingual” translation as an interpretation of 
verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language and “interlingual” translation as an 
interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language (Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects 
of Translation,” The Translation Studies Reader, p. 114). Characterizing both of these acts as 
translation reinforces the metaphor that communication is translation, in both a literary and non-
literary sense. 
30 Steiner, After Babel, p. 54 
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a pseudo-evolutionary one, arguing that the immense plurality of 
languages affords us an infinite number of ways of conceptualizing our 
world which help us “endure creatively,” though they do not actually 
seem to offer distinct survival advantages.31 Here evolution is treated 
more as metaphor than science, though it is a powerful metaphor. In 
any case Steiner’s account further highlights the importance of using 
actual translation as a tool for understanding language, and it is this 
basic premise that I agree with.  
Translation is not always problematic; some expressions do not 
appear to present us with conflicting concepts of meaning. Simple 
words or sentences often seem to be quite transparent between 
languages, and indeed we are grateful that they are. If we considered 
Quine’s dilemma anytime we tried to render the word “rabbit” into 
another language, cross-cultural communication would be an endlessly 
frustrating endeavor. Fortunately, I think it is fair to assume that no 
one engaged in actual translation spends much time worrying about the 
inscrutability of reference. However, a certain degree of indeterminacy 
remains even in translating prosaic expressions. This indeterminacy 
increases, as Quine pointed out, the farther we move away from words 
and sentences that are directly tied to stimulus conditions. Translators, 
and especially literary translators, must be aware that it is possible to 
conceive of a word having multiple (perhaps incompatible) meanings.  
For more specific examples of how this might occur in literary 
translation, I will now turn to Nabokov and Eugene Onegin. Originally 
published in 1833 by Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s most famous poet, 
Eugene Onegin is a novel in verse consisting of 5,551 lines. The vast 
majority of these lines are in rhymed iambic tetrameter, resembling a 
sonnet.32 Historically, it has been the source of extensive disagreement 
among translators; at least ten published English versions of it exist, if 
not more. Traditional attempts at translation have sought to render the 
poem in the same iambic tetrameter as the Russian original. The 
problem inherent in this project is clear: since the words were picked to 
rhyme in Russian, a direct translation does not guarantee that they will 
rhyme at all in English (or any other language). Manipulation of 
meaning is necessary to replicate the rhyme scheme.33 
This situation places the translator in a unique dilemma, however, 
because it seems that at least some literary elements must be sacrificed 
31 Ibid, p. xiv 
32 Nabokov, “‘Onegin’ in English,” The Translation Studies Reader, pp 72-73. 
33 This is true of all rhymed poems in translation, of course; Eugene Onegin is just one example.  
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for others. Nabokov offers, as an example of this dilemma, stanza 
XXXIII in Chapter One, rendered in unrhymed English and 
transliterated Russian:34 
I recollect the sea before a storm:  Ya pómnyu móre pred grozóyu: 
O how I envied    kak ya zavídoval volnám 
The waves that ran in turbulent succession  begúshchim búrnoy cheredóyu 
To lie down at her feet with love!  S lyukóv’yu lech k eyó nogám! 
 
According to Nabokov, “Russian readers discern in the original 
two sets of beautifully onomatopoeic alliterations: begúshchim búrnoy…
which render the turbulent rush of the surf, and s lyukóv’yu lech – the 
liquid lisp of the waves dying in adoration at the lady’s feet.”35 A non-
native speaker can, I think, experience an approximation of the rhyme 
and rhyme by sounding out the Russian words, even without knowing 
their meaning, and see that Nabokov is correct. He is also correct in 
observing that, “Without various changes, there is no possibility 
whatsoever to make Pushkin’s four lines an alternately-rhymed tetra-
metric quatrain in English […] one concession would involve us in a 
number of other changes completely breaking up the original sense and 
all its literary associations.”36
We get a sense of how difficult such a project is when we realize 
that Nabokov translates “búrnoy” as “turbulent,” but alternate diction-
ary definitions include “stormy,” “rapid,” and “energetic.”37 A choice 
of any of these other words would make different options available for 
the attempted tetrametric quatrain. Is there really any way to determine 
which is the “right” translation of “búrnoy”? For literary translators, 
every move involves a decision amongst many choices, none of them 
inherently more correct than the other.38 Nabokov deviated quite 
shockingly from the traditional strategy by abandoning all attempts to 
preserve the rhyme and rhythm of the original poem and furthermore, 
condemning those who did. In the introduction to his version of Eugene 
Onegin he says, point blank, that “some paraphrases may possess the 
charm of stylish diction and idiomatic conciseness, but no scholar 
should succumb to stylishness and no reader be fooled by it.”39 For 
34 Nabokov, “‘Onegin in English,” The Translation Studies Reader, p. 82 
35 Ibid, p. 82 
36 Ibid 
37 Oxford Russian Dictionary, comp. Della Thompson. Oxford University Press, 1998. 
38 See also Levy, “Translation as a Decision Process,” The Translation Studies Reader, pp 149-159 
39 Alexander Pushkin, Eugene Onegin. Trans. and commentary Vladimir Nabokov. Princeton, NJ: 
The Bollingen Foundation, Princeton University Press, 1981. p. vii 
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Nabokov the best way to deal with the change in form that translation 
entails is to face it head on – do not try to hide it or fix it. In his 
opinion the only real way to do this (for a rhymed poem) is a literal 
prose translation.  
He may have a valid criticism of the traditional approach, but I 
think he is also too quick to dismiss “stylishness” as a legitimate goal. A 
paraphrase is simply one way of dealing with a rhymed poem in a 
foreign language, and chooses to focus on a different aspect of the text. 
Although it may be “mathematically impossible,” as Nabokov points 
out, to reproduce the rhymes accurately and translate the text literally, 
the latter option is not intrinsically more valuable than the former. 
Most translators champion the opposite strategy, some quite strongly: 
“Rhythm, rhyme, sense, and tone – all of them together are what Eugene 
Onegin is about, and not just literal meaning. To throw any of these 
overboard is to destroy the poem utterly,” writes Douglas Hofstadter in 
the introduction to his version of Eugene Onegin.40 
How are we to reconcile these two views? No matter which 
strategy is employed, the one thing that remains sure is that Pushkin’s 
poem gets fundamentally changed. Can our philosophy of language offer 
us any criterion of evaluation for differing translations? If we insist on 
extralinguistic meaning, i.e. one that depends upon the author’s inten-
tions separate from either language, we will have a hard time resolving 
the debate. The question then becomes, “who has greater insight into 
Pushkin’s mind, Nabokov or Hofstadter?” and this is of course an 
impossible question to answer. A similar problem is encountered in 
Davidson’s work on metaphor. On some views what gives a metaphor 
meaning are the intentions of the author. However Davidson points 
out, quite correctly I think, that this cannot be right because these are 
neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for a successful metaphor.41 
I think this is true for translation as well. At the same time the 
intentions (or perceived intentions) of the author are not negligible; 
Nabokov’s attempt to do justice to what Pushkin’s words literally 
indicate is an admirable project. The problem is precisely that, as 
mentioned earlier, no translation has an intrinsic value over another. 
We could say that Nabokov’s translation is more literal than 
Hofstadter’s, and Nabokov would probably want to say that this makes 
it more accurate, but I think accuracy would incorporate the other 
40 Alexander Pushkin, Eugene Onegin. Trans. Douglas Hofstadter. New York: Basic  
Books, 1999. p. xxxiv 
41 Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 
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elements of the poem as well – the rhythm, rhyme, and tone that Hof-
stadter emphasizes. So true accuracy is, as Nabokov notes, impossible. 
And neither version of Eugene Onegin, Hofstadter’s or Nabokov’s (or 
any of the others) can lay claim to the “true meaning” of the original.  
We would want to preserve the right to judge these different 
translations, of course; some may in fact be better than others. My 
argument is merely that it is problematic to view this judgment in terms 
of meaning. Is there a way to clarify the notion of meaning, given 
competing translations? I think what is missing from the account (and 
what could potentially enrich it) is a consideration of the varying 
translations together, and not just separately. When considered in iso-
lation from each other, I believe there is no plausible criterion of 
evaluation for different translations. When analyzed alongside each 
other, however, a particular type of evaluation may be possible. 
Hofstadter realizes this possibility when he describes the experience of 
simultaneously reading two versions of Eugene Onegin (translated by 
Charles Johnston and James Falen) out loud with his wife: “We even 
felt we could get a slight taste of the Russian poetry itself, for between 
the two translators’ ways of phrasing things, details of the original in a 
certain sense showed through.”42 In this case, it is the relationship of 
each translation to the other, and not just to the original work, that is 
critical. What Hofstadter describes, and what I think may be the key to 
a good philosophy of translation in the literary sense, is an experience 
of dialectic understanding. In going back and forth between 
translations, an idea of what gets left out, what gets “lost in 
translation,” becomes apparent; from that sense, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the text is possible. The tension between differing, yet 
equally plausible, translations is what is capable of creating meaning in 
literary texts.   
The idea that meaning is created, rather than discovered, is a logical 
implication of the Wittgensteinian doctrine that “meaning is use.” We 
do not use a word because it is connected to a deep, unchanging 
meaning that determines its use; we use a word in a certain way because 
it works to get us around the world, and if we find another word that 
works just as well (as language inevitably changes) we will start using 
the other word – consequently it will acquire a new or different meaning. 
But, as Richard Rorty points out: “The world does not provide us with 
any criterion of choice between alternative metaphors […] we can only 
42 Hofstadter, Eugene Onegin, p. xiii 
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compare languages or metaphors with one another, not with something 
beyond language called ‘fact.’”43 I would argue, as an extension of this, 
that we should compare literary translations with each other, in addition 
to the “original,” which is of course in itself just another layer of 
language and metaphor we use to get around in the world. This requires 
that we develop a philosophy of language that sees meaning, both 
within and across languages, as a contingent creation. It is not an 
arbitrary creation, however, but one deeply rooted in the history of the 
surrounding language-games. Another quote from Hofstadter supports 
this point: “…I looked each [Russian word] up and knew its rough 
meaning […] but any time a word appeared in two or three different 
stanzas, in quite different contexts, it started picking up its own flavor 
and started being imbued with more of a true meaning.”44 The 
emergence of meaning, in this case, is only possible in context, in a 
richly detailed surrounding environment. Although I am skeptical about 
Hofstadter’s characterization of this as the “true” meaning (because I 
think the notion of truth it is too easily associated with non-contingent, 
objective “facts” such as the ones Rorty objects to), I think it is fair to 
say that it is a more comprehensive and thus more valuable meaning.  
What happens, however, when this quest for meaning runs 
aground? Surely not all literary translation is achieved with the smooth 
success of Hofstadter’s example. A particularly relevant text on this 
topic, I believe, is a poem Nabokov wrote during his translation work 
on Eugene Onegin. I will quote it in its entirety, since I think it powerfully 
expresses the tragic element of translation and can offer insight into 
how we think of literary translation: 
 
What is translation? On a platter 
A poet’s pale and glaring head, 
A parrot’s screech, a monkey’s chatter, 
And profanation of the dead. 
The parasites you were so hard on 
Are pardoned if I have your pardon, 
O, Pushkin, for my stratagem: 
I traveled down your secret stem, 
And reached the root, and fed upon it; 
Then, in a language newly learned, 
I grew another stalk and turned 
Your stanza patterned on a sonnet, 
Into my honest roadside prose –  
All thorn, but cousin to your rose. 
 
43 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 20 
44 Hofstadter, Eugene Onegin, p. xv 
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Reflected words can only shiver 
Like elongated lights that twist 
In the black mirror of a river 
Between the city and the mist. 
Elusive Pushkin! Persevering, 
I still pick up Tatiana's earring, 
Still travel with your sullen rake. 
I find another man's mistake, 
I analyze alliterations 
That grace your feasts and haunt the great 
Fourth stanza of your Canto Eight. 
This is my task — a poet's patience 
And scholastic passion blent: 
Dove-droppings on your monument.45 
Nabokov’s vivid imagery implies that translation is a fundamentally 
intrusive act. Why should this be so? As has been argued by many 
modern writers, the form and content of a piece of literature (or any 
other linguistic expression) cannot be separated and are mutually 
reinforcing. 46 To change the form is also, to some extent, to change the 
content. Which language is used is a fundamental aspect of form; 
translation, then, is unavoidably a process of change. In Nabokov’s 
eyes, it is a negative process, because it denigrates the original author. 
One can certainly sympathize with this concern, especially given that 
Nabokov was an author himself. We don’t have to look far to find 
countless examples of things that get “lost in translation,” either in a 
colloquial or a literary sense. Often it proves nearly impossible to 
render a writer into a language not their own without feeling as if 
something critical has been sacrificed, or at the very least com-
promised.47 In Davidson’s terms, this would be a case in which passing 
theories simply cannot converge.  
If meaning were in fact a trustworthy medium through which we 
could pass in the effort to translate between languages, then we could 
put the difficulty in terms of incomplete access to meaning. A poor 
translation would be, in Steiner’s words, “full of apparently similar 
saying, but misses the bond of meaning.”48 In an attempt to retain a 
pragmatic sense of meaning, however (in the tradition of Wittgenstein, 
45 Nabokov, Eugene Onegin, p. 9 
46 See Eichenbaum, Boris. “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method.’” Russian Formalist Criticism: Four 
Essays. Ed. And trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1965. p, 119, 130; See also Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. chapter 1 
47 For example, see David Remnick, “The Translation Wars: Fighting over Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky.” The New Yorker. November 7, 2005. pp. 98-109. 
48 Steiner, After Babel, p. 67 
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Davidson, and Quine), we cannot resort to the latter explanation. All 
that meaning consists in, under the latter view, is “apparently similar 
saying,” so the distinction is not useful. We must admit that it is actual 
translation itself that inherently complicates the situation, and that it 
does so always. That some translations seem less problematic than 
others is simply luck; we are fortunate, in some cases, to be able to 
move with relative ease between languages – that is to say, with relative 
lack of disagreement. It is not that it is easier to translate instruction 
manuals than it is to translate poetry; it is simply that there are fewer 
conflicting opinions about the former. As we move from concrete to 
abstract language, the criterion for evaluating translation becomes more 
and more complex, since meaning is farther removed from its stimulus 
conditions. Additionally, poetry is often concerned with the verbal 
qualities of language itself, such as alliteration, rhythm, and rhyme, 
which operates differently within each particular language, making 
translation more difficult. 
Most importantly, though, I think Nabokov’s poem is a testimony 
to the sense of loss we must sometimes encounter in literary 
translation, whether we are authors or readers. Heidegger understood 
that loss and characterized it as silence, and he accorded it a central 
place in his philosophy of language. What Nabokov describes is what 
Heidegger would call an “experience with language.” We can use 
language by speaking it, and we can gather information about language 
via linguistics or analytic philosophy, but to undergo an experience with 
language is something else entirely: it is to “become mindful of 
language and our relation to it.” 49 Furthermore, “A poet might even 
come to the point where he is compelled – in his own way, that is, 
poetically – to put into language the experience he undergoes with 
language.”50 As I see it, this is exactly what has happened to Nabokov. 
Translating Pushkin’s masterpiece has brought the difficulties of 
meaning into sharp focus for him. Nabokov’s final lines imply that 
“reflected words” are always tragically insufficient to convey the power 
of the original work.  
In a broader sense, though, if we follow Wittgenstein and Rorty 
and Davidson, we realize that all words are merely reflected. They are 
not a reflection of truth or meaning in an objective sense, but a 
reflection of each other, in a dynamic interaction that shapes what we 
49 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, Trans. Peter Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 
p. 58 
50 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 59 
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consider truth and meaning to be. And an intrinsic part of that 
interaction is a sense of incompleteness, or loss. It is this foundation 
that language and meaning are built upon; in the struggle to articulate 
what we cannot say, we discover what we can say. And in the presence 
of something inarticulable, we are even more acutely aware of language 
than ever. As Heidegger puts it, “…language speaks itself as language 
[…] when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns 
us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave 
unspoken what we have in mind, and, without rightly giving it thought, 
undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly 
touched us with its essential being.”51 
There are aspects of Heidegger’s views of meaning and truth that 
are incompatible with the one I have been arguing for,52 but I feel his 
contribution to this discussion is too valuable to overlook. More 
explicitly than any other writer, he develops the idea that the absence of 
language is vital to its presence; that by delineating the boundaries of 
what cannot be put into words we might eventually come to a greater 
understanding of our language and our world. This is a process marked 
by continuing dialogue, and indeed much of Heidegger’s writing on the 
subject of language is structured as an actual dialogue. Wittgenstein, in 
the previously mentioned Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, also believed 
there were some things in the world that eluded language; in the face of 
this dilemma, he implied that the only possible course of action was to 
remain silent.  
Initially, this sentiment might seem at odds with a project that sees 
silence as a source of dialectic tension within language. It is more in line 
with a Nabokovian view that perhaps, in light of our repeated failure to 
make words mean what we desire them to, we should just stop trying. 
But I think neither Nabokov nor Wittgenstein really wanted to stop at 
silence. What is remarkable about language is its ability to take us past 
the limits we though we had identified, to redefine and change those 
limits. Also in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein says that although “There are, 
indeed, things that cannot be put into words […] they make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical.”53 Perhaps if we pay close enough 
attention to the silence, and if we approach it as a tool for 
understanding rather than evidence of failure, we will in fact bring 
51 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, p. 59 
52 Most notably, I suspect his emphasis on truth as “unconcealment,” as something that is revealed 
to us, is at odds with the metaphor of meaning as an act of creation.  
53 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p. 151 (Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es 
ist das Mystische)
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ourselves closer to those things that make themselves manifest without 
words. What is importance here is silence as a relational concept, inso-
far as it interacts with language. There are different types of silence, 
after all, and not all of them have the significance that I am arguing for. 
Looking at the particular kind of silence we encounter as we struggle to 
articulate our experiences can help us figure out why certain things can 
or cannot by expressed by language, and also shed light on the concept 
of meaning that operates within a language (or between two languages). 
If nothing else, to succeed in characterizing the experience of 
inarticulate silence is to reaffirm the power of language and the rich and 
satisfying ways we are capable of describing the world in – even if what 
we are describing is, paradoxically, our frustration at the failure of our 
ability to describe. I believe this crisis is what is at the heart of 
Nabokov’s poem. It is also an issue that our philosophy of language 
must incorporate in order to do justice to the immense complexity and 
difficulty of translation. If we accept the premise that meaning is 
created – by ourselves, our words, and our actions – we must also 
accept a certain amount of responsibility. Successful communication is 
not a case of making sure our words correlate to the right meaning, but 
rather of manipulating meaning so as to arrive at coherent 
understanding with another person or people. This is the view of 
language that Davidson ultimately comes up with when claims: “this 
characterisation of linguistic ability is so nearly circular that it cannot be 
wrong: it comes down to saying that the ability to communicate by 
speech consists in the ability to make oneself understood, and to 
understand.”54 This, however, puts us in a different role than traditional 
philosophy of language does. We must be aware of the ways in which 
our use of language shapes meaning and truth, both on an individual 
and a collective level. We must also realize that conflicting uses of 
language provide the critical tension that helps create, maintain, and 
clarify meaning.  
The ability of conflict to generate meaning in a dialectic fashion is 
what makes the notion of dialogue is so critical, especially for 
Heidegger. Literary translation can be seen as a kind of dialogue as well 
– simply a larger one that occurs between entire languages rather than 
within them. In this dialogue, what is lost in translation is also the 
foundation for what is found in translation. And I think there are several 
things we can find in translation. One is an opportunity to experience 
54 Davidson, Truth, Language, and History, p. 107 
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literature (as well as culture and history) that we might not otherwise 
have access to. Hofstadter writes, in critique of Nabokov, that he has a  
fanatical attitude towards originals and translation – namely, that a work can be appreciated 
only in its original language, and that no attempt should be made to reproduce the feel of the 
work in any other language. Those […] who are ignorant of the original tongue are simply 
doomed to remain deprived of that experience.55 
I think this is an excellent point, and I find it very personally 
compelling. It would seem a tragedy rather than a victory to restrict 
works of literature to their own language. It is true that the experience 
that the reader has with a translated work is different than with the 
original, but it is still a valid and valuable experience with language.  
A translator does have an enormous amount of responsibility, 
however, both to translate to the best of their faith and ability to make 
that process sufficiently transparent to their readers. If a reader is 
unaware of the difficulties encountered when translating the text they 
are reading, or unaware that it is translated at all, I think their ability to 
fully understand the text is compromised. The act of translation, if 
done well, must take these considerations into account. This means the 
translator is deeply engaged both with the original text and the 
translations that have come before him – prior theory and passing 
theory are both essential to achieving a successful translation. 
Furthermore, out of the tension implicit in these relationships another 
kind of experience with language is possible, such as that depicted in 
Nabokov’s poem. Finally, “poetry in translation is either poetry born 
anew or it is nothing it all,” according to Burton Raffel.56 This 
sentiment emphasizes that translation, as well as language itself, is 
ultimately an act of human artistic creation. Thus, I would argue, it is an 
inherently valuable endeavor. This endeavor is something else that is 
found, rather than lost, in translation.  
It is only by developing a holistic view of language, meaning, and 
truth – one that is committed to contingency and dialectic under-
standing – that we can hope to satisfactorily describe and do justice to 
literary translation. In return, a study that considers translated works in 
comparison with each other can offer insight into how meaning is 
created within and across languages. When we only consider hypo-
thetical acts of translation in philosophy, we deprive ourselves of one 
of our richest resources for understanding language. Literary trans-
55 Hofstadter, Eugene Onegin, p. xxiv 
56 Burton Raffel, The Forked Tongue: A Study of the Translation Process. The Hague: Mouton & Co. 
N.V., Publishers, 1971. p. 115 
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lation, as I have attempted to show, is philosophically significant and 
rewarding topic that deserves a place in any comprehensive philosophy 
of language. It focuses our sense of what gets left out in language, but 
in doing so also reminds us that language sometimes can succeed in 
capturing what the world around us is like, and powerfully so. 
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